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Abstract
The analysis of the strategic interaction in a simultaneous choice of care situation when
victim's costs di®er has not been object of speci¯c attention in the literature, despite the real-
world signi¯cance of heterogeneous costs of care among types of victims (children, handicapped
persons, just to cite a few).In the paper we characterize the optimal regulation of a standard
bilateral accident setting when there are two di®erent types of victims. Harm resulting from the
accident is the same for the two types, but the cost of the precautionary e®ort di®ers across them.
The injurer and the victim precautionary e®orts are substitutes, with the implication that with
perfect information (¯rst-best), the e±cient e®ort level exerted by the injurer must be higher the
higher the cost for the victim. We then analyze the setting in which the injurer cannot observe at
all the victim's type, and this fact can be veri¯ed by Courts. The ¯rst-best cannot be implemented
by direct legal regulation, speci¯cally, it cannot be implemented with the use of a negligence rule
based on the ¯rst-best levels of care.
The second-best solution leads the injurer to exert an intermediate level of precautionary
e®ort, and to the two types of victims to choose the best response to that intermediate level. This
second-best solution can be easily implemented by legal rules using a negligence formula with
second-best level of care as due care level. Courts cannot implement this second-best, however,
using a negligence rule based on the ¯rst-best levels of care.
We then move to explore imperfect (as distinct from perfect or none at all) observation of the
victim's type. We characterize the optimal solution in this setting, and examine the di®erent legal
alternatives when Courts cannot verify the injurers' statements concerning whether they had or
not observed the victim before taking care. Counterintuitively, we show that there is no di®erence
at all between the use by Courts of a rule of complete trust and a rule of complete distrust towards
the injurers' statements.
We then relate the ¯ndings of the model with existing rules and doctrines in Common Law
and Civil Law legal systems, and discuss some rationales for the use by Courts of di®erentiated
standards of care for the injurer based on the type of the actual accident victim, even when the
probability of observation of the victim's type is very low.
2
1 Introduction
The standard economic model of accidents and liability, in its simplest form, assumes
a world of homogenous populations of potential injurers and victims. Potential injurers
are typically assumed to be identical, in terms of bene¯ts derived from the potentially
harmful activity, of costs of care, and of wealth. The same happens with victims, who
are also assumed to be perfectly interchangeable in all respects. Expositions of this simple
standard economic model can be found in Shavell (1987), and SchÄafer and SchÄonenberger
(1998).
It is undeniable that in the real world many situations giving rise to accidents signif-
icantly depart from this restrictive set of assumptions. Both the injurer and the victim
in a given accident may be drawn from heterogeneous populations of potential injurers,
potential victims, and both. Some injurers derive larger, sometimes much larger, bene¯ts
than others from engaging in an activity which might result in harm to third-parties. Some
injurers face larger, sometimes much larger, costs of taking care and adopting precautionary
measures than others. Some injurers are wealthier, sometimes much wealthier, than others.
These departures from the most basic set of assumptions have already been, to a large
extent, substantially explored in the Law and Economics literature.
The heterogeneity of injurers in terms of their ability (and cost) to take care has been an-
alyzed in economic terms, and the bene¯ts and costs of using general and average standards
of due care instead of individualized and subjective standards have been duly examined in
previous work: Landes and Posner (1987), Shavell (1987), Schwartz (1989), Miceli (1997)],
Edlin (1998). Similarly, wealth di®erences among injurers and their impact on liability rules
have also been considered in the literature (Arlen (1992), Miceli and Segerson (1995))1.
The issues arising from victims' heterogeneity have received a good deal less of attention
1The use of Tort liability as a redistribution mechanism has also been extensively discussed in the
literature, although with di®erent theoretical and policy goals in mind: Kaplow and Shavell (1994,2000),
Sanchirico (2000, 2001), and Avraham, Fortus and Logue (2002).
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in the literature. The source of victims' heterogeneity most extensively considered has been
that related to the level of harm su®ered by the victim. Landes and Posner (1987), Miceli
(1997), and specially Kaplow and Shavell (1996), have analyzed the use of average versus
individualized damage awards in the presence of heterogeneous victims in terms of their
levels of harm resulting from an accident.
But victims, ostensibly, do not only di®er in terms of the harm they are likely to
experience if an accident takes place, but also in their relative ability and cost of taking
care. For some types of victim, several (or many, even all) measures that may be adopted
to reduce the likelihood of an accident are more costly than for other types of victim. Let's
think, for instance, of children (although other examples are possible, and even likely)
compared to adults. Taking care is, for most activities in which the participant might
be harmed, more costly for children than for adults. Refraining from running on the
sidewalk, watching for coming autos before crossing the road, using equipment with strength
and ability, or resisting the temptation of trespassing on a premise that promises some
excitement, is usually easier for adults than for children. For children under a certain age,
and for some of those activities, even the most obvious precautionary measures can be
prohibitively costly.
These di®erences in the costs of taking care carry over to the determination of the
optimal levels of precaution. Other things being equal, the costlier the care for a given
victim, the lower the optimal level of care should be. This is universally acknowledged by
legal systems: The levels of care that legal systems require of minors are consistently lower
than those required of adults. Even if still "general" or "objective", because they do not
descend to the individual abilities and conditions of every single child, due care standard
for a child is that of reasonable care not for an adult, but for a typical child within that age
range. Evidence of this attitude across legal systems (both Common Law and Civil Law
systems) can be found in Von Bar (1998) and Prosser and Keeton (1984).
In a bilateral accident setting when care measures of injurers and victims are correlated
(they are substitutes, for instance), the lower optimal level of care of a given group within
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the population of potential victims, increases the optimal level of care of the injurer. This
issue of the interaction of victims' heterogeneity, on the one side, and levels of care of
the injurer, on the other, in simultaneous choice of care situations, has been largely unex-
plored in the previous Law and Economics literature on these issues, who has, explicitly or
implicitly, restricted its scope to unilateral accidents, strict liability, or both.
The goal of the paper is precisely to analyse the interaction between the levels of care
of heterogeneous victims and the injurer under a negligence regime, and how di®erent legal
implementation options can bring us close or far from the optimal levels of care for victims
and injurer.
The paper will be organized as follows: In section 2 we present the model and char-
acterize the ¯rst best and the second best. In section 3 we examine some of the basic
implementation options using a negligence rule de¯ning due care levels. Section 4 ana-
lyzes the optimal solutions and implementation options when the injurer can observe the
victim type with some positive probability lower than one. Section 5 discusses the major
implications of the model for the application of the negligence rule and compare them with
existing rules and doctrines in di®erent legal systems. We conclude by discussing the scope
and implications of the model. All proofs are relegated to a technical appendix.
2 The model
We study the standard bilateral accident setting in which the behavior of a injurer and
the behavior of the potential victim, a®ect the likelihood of an accident but considering
that there are di®erent types of victims. In particular, we assume that there are two
di®erent types of victims µ1 and µ2: The ex-ante probability of type µ1 is ®; and the ex-
ante probability of µ2 is 1 ¡ ®: We assume that all the actors are risk neutral and that
it is costly for the injurer and the victim to take precautions. Let C(x) be the injurer
cost of the precaution e®ort x. We assume @C(x)@x > 0 and
@2C(x)
@x2 > 0 . While the harm
resulting from the accident is the same for the two types of victims, D, victim cost of
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the precaution e®ort y di®ers across types, C(y; µ). We assume µ2 > µ1, and @C(y;µ)@y >
0; @
2C(y;µ)
@y2 > 0;
@C(y;µ)
@µ > 0 and
@2C(y;µ)
@µ@y > 0: Finally, the probability of accident depends on
the victim precaution e®ort y and on the injurer precaution e®ort x; p(x; y): We assume
@p(x;y)
@y < 0;
@2p(x;y)
@y2 > 0;
@p(x;y)
@x < 0;
@2p(x;y)
@x2 > 0; and we assume that the injurer and the
victim precaution e®ort are substitutes @
2p(x;y)
@x@y > 0: We also assume that the legal system
regulates behavior through the use of negligence rules implemented by Courts.
2.1 First best solution
We start by characterizing the ¯rst best solution, in which the injurer can observe the
victim type before choosing his precautionary e®ort.
max
x1;x2;y1;y2
®[¡p(x1; y1)D ¡ C(x1) ¡ C(y1; µ1)] + (1 ¡ ®)[¡p(x2; y2)D¡ C(x2) ¡ C(y2; µ2)]
The next Lemma shows, as expected, that the ¯rst best solution implies that the less
able victim (the one with higher cost of e®ort ) optimally exerts a lower level of care, which
is fully intuitive given the higher cost of the µ2 type of victim.
Lemma 1 y¤1 > y¤2:
Given that, and as we are assuming that the injurer and the victim precautionary e®orts
are substitutes, the next Lemma follows as an immediate consequence of Lemma 1. It states
that at the optimum the injurer exerts a higher precautionary e®ort when facing a high
cost victim.
Lemma 2 x¤1 < x¤2
2.2 Second best solution
In the second best solution the injurer can not observe the victim type, so he has to
choose the same kind of precautionary e®ort with respect to both types of victims.
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max
x;y1;y2
®[¡p(x; y1)D ¡ C(y1; µ1)] + (1¡ ®)[¡p(x; y2)D¡ C(y2; µ2)] ¡ C(x)
Similarly to the ¯rst best solution, and due to the cost di®erence between the two, the next
Lemma shows that in the second best solution the less able victim exerts a lower level of
precautionary e®ort.
Lemma 3 y¤¤1 > y¤¤2 :
The next Lemma states that the second-best solution leads the injurer, as might be ex-
pected, to exert an intermediate level of precautionary e®ort. Moreover, this precautionary
e®ort is increasing in the ex-ante probability of facing a less able victim.
Lemma 4 x¤¤ 2 [x¤1; x¤2] and decreasing on ®: If ® = 1 then x¤¤ = x¤1 , if ® = 0 then
x¤¤ = x¤2
Finally, given that the injurer exerts an intermediate level of precautionary e®ort and
that the injurer and the victim precaution e®ort are substitutes, the less able victim in-
creases his precaution e®ort while the more able victim reduces his precaution e®ort.
Lemma 5 y¤¤1 < y¤1 and y¤¤2 > y¤2:
Notice that the less able victims are better o® in the ¯rst best solution than in the
second best solution since the injurer's e®ort towards them is reduced, and thus they are
forced to increase care to make up for that reduction.
3 Implementing Solutions with the Negligence Rule
3.1 Di®erentiated negligence rule when the victim's type is observable
We start with the simplest case in which the injurer can observe the victim's type. In
this case we will show that a di®erentiated negligence rule based on the victim's type can
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implement the ¯rst best solution. A di®erentiated negligence rule sets two di®erent levels
of care depending on the victim's type. This di®erentiated negligence rule determines that
the injurer has to pay damages equal to D if an accident materializes and the precautionary
e®ort of the injurer is lower than xiwhere i is the victim's type.
Lemma 6 If x1= x¤1 and x2= x¤2 the di®erentiated negligence rule implements the ¯rst best
solution
So, according to Lemma 6, if Courts are able to set due care levels at the optimal levels
for each type of victim, the di®erentiated negligence rule can directly induce the ¯rst-best
solution when the injurer can observe the victims' type prior to the adoption of care.
3.2 Uniform negligence rule when the victim's type is not observable
When the injurer is unable to observe to which type belongs the victim he is facing,
a di®erentiated negligence rule does not seem, in principle, an appealing alternative on
e±ciency grounds. A uniform negligence rule can do the trick in this case. If the negligence
rules sets a single required level of precaution e®ort x, which coincides with the second-
best level of care for the injurer, the second-best solution is attainable. Now we cannot
achieve the ¯rst best solution since the injurer can not observe the victim's type, but, as
the next Lemma shows, the simple uniform negligence rule just mentioned can implement
the second-best optimum.
Lemma 7 If x= x¤¤ the uniform negligence rule implements the second best solution.
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4 Imperfect Observation of the Victim's Type
4.1 The benchmark case
We consider that the injurer can observe the victim type with probability ¾, being this
probability common knowledge. We assume that the victims do not know whether or not
the injurer observes their type2. The e±cient solution under these informational constraints
is given by the following maximization problem, where xN is the intermediate e®ort exerted
by the injurer when he does not observe the victim's type:
max
x1;x2;xN ;y1;y2
¾ [®[¡p(x1; y1)D ¡ C(x1)] + (1 ¡ ®)[¡p(x2; y2)D ¡ C(x2)]] +
(1¡ ¾)[¡®p(xN ; y1)D ¡ (1¡ ®)p(xN; y2)D ¡ C(xN)] ¡ ®C(y1; µ1) ¡ (1¡ ®)C(y2; µ2)
Notice that if ¾ = 1 this problem coincides with the ¯rst best, while that if ¾ = 0 the
problem coincides with the second best solution. The next Lemma characterizes the solution
of this problem
Lemma 8 x¤1 < x¤N1 < x¤NN < x¤N2 < x¤2 and y¤1 > y¤N1 > y¤¤1 > y¤¤2 > y¤N2 > y¤2:
The e±cient solution under imperfect observability is characterized by victims' inter-
mediate levels of care (labelled y¤N1 and y¤N2 ) between the ¯rst best and the second best
solution. Given that, when the injurer observes the victim, he takes less care when the
victim is a high cost victim and higher care when the victim is a low cost victim with
respect to the ¯rst best solution. Finally, when the injurer does not observe he chooses an
intermediate level of care, similarly to the second best.
This solution can be easily implemented using a negligence rule when Courts can verify
whether the injurer actually observed the victim's type or not. The optimal negligence rule
has two cases,
2Notice, that if the victims know whether the injurer observe or not the solution coincides with the ¯rst
best (in the case of informed injurer) or second best (in the case of uninformed injurer).
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a) when the injurer has observed the victim's type the rule should be a di®erentiated
negligence rule based on the victim's type, like the one that implements the ¯rst best
solution. This di®erentiated negligence rule sets two di®erent levels of care depending
on the victim's type. The injurer has to pay damages equal to D if an accident
materializes and the precautionary e®ort of the injurer is lower than xi; where i is
the victim's type. The levels of care should be x1= x¤N1 and x2= x¤N2 :
b) when the injurer has not observed the victim's type the rule should be a uniform
negligence rule ¯xing a single required level of precaution e®ort x= x¤NN , under which
the injurer would pay damages equal to D to the plainti® (the victim).
4.2 Injurer Opportunism
More realistically, in this subsection we will analyze the previous imperfect information
set up incorporating unveri¯ability by Courts of the injurer's observation of the victim's
type. In particular, the game that we want to analyze is the following:
1. Courts set levels of due care.
2. Nature decides the types of the victims and if injurers observe or not victims' types.
3. Injurers and victims choose the level of care.
4. The accident takes place or not according with the probabilities generated by the
levels of care.
5. In the case of an accident, the injurer submits a statement concerning observation of
the victim's type, and Courts decide liability based on the statement (according to the
policies of trust and distrust described below), the victim's type and the negligence
rule.
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We solve this game by backwards induction. We look ¯rst at the liability decision by
Courts, then we analyze the choice of care, and ¯nally we study the optimal levels of due
care set by the Courts.
We assume that Courts could use a complex negligence regime comprising three levels
of due care. A higher level of due care for injurers who observe a high cost victim x2, a
low level of due care for injurers who observe a low cost victim x1, and an intermediate
level of care for non-observing injurers xN. Therefore, in this scenario there is ample room
for injurer's opportunistic behavior, given that he can observe a high cost victim and later
pretend (something that Courts cannot tell if it is true or false) that he has not observed
the victim's type, in order to exert a lower level of e®ort and save precautionary costs.
What seems to be crucial in this setting is the policy that Courts follow concerning the
credibility of the injurers' statements. We consider that Courts may follow two extreme
two policies:
1. A policy of complete trust towards the statements made by injurers and
2. A policy of complete distrust, whereby Courts never give credit to the statements by
the injurer in those situations in which opportunism may play a role. Therefore, if the
injurer claims that he did not observe the victim's type and the victim is actually a
high cost victim, Courts would require compliance with the level of care corresponding
to the high cost victim. In other words, under the policy of distrust, Courts will
require for high cost victims the level of care designed for them, independently of the
observability of the victim's type.
4.2.1 Policy of trust Provided that Courts believe the injurer's statement claim-
ing that he did not observe the victim's type, and the victim is a high cost victim, the
injurer is not going to exert the e®ort required for the high cost victim when he in fact ob-
serves that the victim is high cost. Consequently, the injurer will never exert more than the
intermediate non-observability required level xN . Thus, the injurers observing the victims'
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type, either low or high cost, have a dominant strategy: those observing low cost victims
always choose x1 and those observing high cost victims always choose xN .
Contrary to the conventional asymmetric information settings, the incentive problem
of the injurer not observing is more complicated than that of the informed injurers. Given
our previous assumption that Courts set (x1; xN ; x2) and depending on parameters of the
populations, they can opt for three di®erent strategies exerting x1, xN or an intermediate
level between both of them, x0(y); where x0(y) 2 arg maxf¡(1 ¡ ®)p(x; y)D ¡ C(x)g. We
characterize the conditions under which the uninformed injurer chooses among them.
1. The uninformed injurer exerts x1 if the vector (x1; xN ; y2) satis¯es the following con-
dition:
(a) x1 ¸ x0(y2) and ¡(1 ¡ ®)p(x1; y2)D ¡ C(x1) > ¡C(xN)
In words, the second part of the condition tells us that the injurer prefers to exert
the low level of e®ort, x1; and taking the risk of paying damages if he faces a high
cost victim than to exert the intermediate level of e®ort xN (set by the Courts, and
in practice the highest level of e®ort required given the trust policy) and thus, avoid
paying any damages. The ¯rst part of the condition excludes the adoption of an
intermediate level of care between x1,and xN. We denote by H1 the set of vectors
(x1; xN ; y2) satisfying this condition.
2. The uninformed injurer exerts x0(y) if the vector (x1; xN ; y2) satis¯es the following
condition:
(a) x1 < x0(y2) and¡(1¡ ®)p(x0(y2); y2)D ¡ C(x0(y2)) > ¡C(xN):
In words, the second part of the condition tells us that the injurer prefers to exert
the intermediate level of e®ort, x0(y2); and taking the risk of paying damages if he
faces a high cost victim than to exert the intermediate level of e®ort xN . The ¯rst
part of the condition shows that given the injurer is liable towards high cost victims,
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he pre®ers to increase the level of care above x1 to reduce the probability of accident.
We denote by H2 the set of vectors (x1; xN ; y2) satisfying this condition.
3. The uninformed injurer exerts xN if the vector (x1; xN; y2) satis¯es one of the two
conditions:
(a) x1 ¸ x0(y2) and ¡(1 ¡ ®)p(x1; y2)D ¡ C(x1) < ¡C(xN); or
(b) x1 < x0(y2) and¡(1¡ ®)p(x0(y); y2)D ¡ C(x0(y)) < ¡C(xN):
In words, the injurer prefers to exert the intermediate level of e®ort xN set by the
Courts, and thus, avoid paying any damages, than to exert a lower x1 or some inter-
mediate level between x1 and xN and paying damages in case of accident with a high
cost victim. We denote by H3 the set of vectors satisfying one or the other of the
above conditions.
These three strategies give rise to three di®erent equilibria.
The ¯rst equilibrium is a partial pooling equilibrium in which injurers who do not
observe the victim type pool with those observing the low cost victims. Then, the e±cient
levels of care under this equilibrium, will be the solution to the following problem3.
max
x1;xN ;y1;y2
¾ [®[¡p(x1; y1)D ¡ C(x1)] + (1 ¡ ®)[¡p(xN ; y2)D ¡ C(x2)]] +
(1¡ ¾)[¡®p(x1; y1)D ¡ (1 ¡ ®)p(x1; y2)D ¡ C(x1)] ¡ ®C(y1; µ1) ¡ (1¡ ®)C(y2; µ2)
s.t. (x1; xN; y2) 2 H1
Beside the incentive compatibility constrain this problem mirrors the problem in the
benchmark non-observability case, with the additional constraint xN = x1: Thus, it is clear
that the welfare now has to be lower than in the benchmark case.
The next Lemma characterizes the solution of this problem
Lemma 9 x¤N1 < x¤NE1 < x¤NN , y¤N2 < y¤NE2 , y¤N1 > y¤NE1 and x¤NE2 < x¤N2
3Note that x2 is absent from the maximization problem, given that a opportunism will make xN .
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The e±cient solution under this equilibrium (labelled in this case as NE) is character-
ized by a level of care for the injurer in the case of unobservability or in the case of facing
a low cost ¯rm, intermediate ( x¤NE1 ) between the optimal one in the benchmark case for
unobservable victims
³
x¤NN
´
and the optimal one for the low cost victim
³
x¤N1
´
. Given this
intermediate level of the injurer, the optimal level of care for the low cost victim is lower
than in the benchmark case
³
y¤N1 > y¤NE1
´
. For the high cost victim, in turn, this implies
a higher level of care than in the benchmark case
³
y¤N2 < y¤NE2
´
, which in turn leads to a
lower level of care under the trust policy towards the high cost victims
³
x¤NE2 < x¤N2
´
.
Therefore, this optimal solution yields clearly winners and losers compared to the bench-
mark case. Low cost victims and injurers facing high cost victims and observing them, both
gain from the policy, whereas high cost victims and the injurers facing low cost victims and
observing them loose. It is ambiguous the e®ect on the injurers who do not observe the
victim's type.
The second equilibrium is a separating equilibrium in which injurers who do not observe
the victim type choose and intermediate level of care between, x1 chosen by injurers ob-
serving low cost victims, and xN chosen by injurers observing high cost victims. Then, the
e±cient levels of care under this equilibrium, will be the solution to the following problem4.
max
x1;xN ;y1;y2
¾ [®[¡p(x1; y1)D ¡ C(x1)] + (1 ¡ ®)[¡p(xN ; y2)D ¡ C(xN)]] +
(1¡ ¾)[¡®p(x0(y2); y1)D ¡ (1¡ ®)p(x0(y2); y2)D ¡ C(x1)] ¡ ®C(y1; µ1) ¡ (1¡ ®)C(y2; µ2)
s.t. (x1; xN; y2) 2 H2
It would be tempting to think that with this separating equilibrium one could mimic
the benchmark case, simply by choosing x1 = x¤N1 and xN = x¤N2 . However, this outcome
is not achievable since the uninformed injurers choose their privately optimal level of care,
x0(y2); taking into account just the high cost victims, the only ones for whom they are
liable, and not all victims as in the benchmark case. Besides x0(y2); the characterization of
the optimal levels of this equilibrium closely resemble the previous case.
4Note that x2 is absent from the maximization problem, given that a opportunism will make xN .
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Finally, the third equilibrium is also a partial pooling equilibrium in which uninformed
injurers pool with those observing the high cost victims. Then, the e±cient levels of care
under this equilibrium, will be the solution to the following problem5:
max
x1;xN ;y1;y2
¾ [®[¡p(x1; y1)D ¡ C(x1)] + (1 ¡ ®)[¡p(xN ; y2)D ¡ C(xN)]] +
(1¡ ¾)[¡®p(xN ; y1)D ¡ (1¡ ®)p(xN; y2)D ¡ C(xN)] ¡ ®C(y1; µ1) ¡ (1¡ ®)C(y2; µ2)
s.t. (x1; xN; y2) 2 H3
Since this problem mirrors the problem in the benchmark non-observability case, with
the constraint x2 = xN ; it is clear that the welfare now has to be lower than in the
benchmark case. The next Lemma characterizes the solution of this problem
Lemma 10 x¤NN < x¤NTN < x¤N2 , y¤N2 < y¤NT2 , y¤N1 > y¤NT1 and x¤NT1 > x¤N1
The e±cient solution under the policy of trust (labelled in this case as NT) is character-
ized by a level of care for the injurer under (real or pretended) conditions of unobservability
intermediate ( x¤NTN ) between the optimal one in the benchmark case for unobservable vic-
tims
³
x¤NN
´
and the optimal one for the high cost victim
³
x¤N2
´
. Given this intermediate
level of the injurer, the optimal level of care for the high cost victim is higher than in the
benchmark case
³
y¤N2 < y¤NT2
´
. For the low cost victim, in turn, the increase in the optimal
intermediate level of care for the injurer implies a lower level of care than in the benchmark
case
³
y¤N1 > y¤NT1
´
, which in turn leads to a higher level of care under the trust policy
towards the low cost victims
³
x¤NT1 > x¤N1
´
.
Therefore, the optimal solution under this equilibrium yields clear winners and losers
compared to the benchmark case. Low cost victims and injurers facing high cost victims
and observing them, both gain from the policy, whereas high cost victims and the rest
of injurers (those encountering low cost victims and those not observing their high cost
counterpart) loose.
5Note that x2is absent from the maximization problem, given thata opportunism will make x2 = xN .
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One can also quite simply characterize the probability of opportunism conditioned on
Courts receiving an unobservability statement by the injurer when the victim is high cost.
By the Bayes' rule this probability is equal to ¾.
It is unclear which of those equilibria provides a higher social surplus. It depends on
the parameters of the population and on the probability of observation the victim's type.
On the one hand, it seems that if ¾ is large, then the probability of opportunistic behavior
of the injurer is high and thus, the ¯rst or second equilibrium are likely to provide a higher
surplus. On the other hand, when the proportion of high cost victims is large, the third
equilibrium is likely to provide more surplus since it avoids the ine±ciency arising from the
uninformed injurer choosing the low level of care.6
4.2.2 Policy of distrust If Courts do not believe the injurer's statement claiming
that he did not observe the victim's type and the victim is a high cost victim. There is no
room, thus, for the informed injurer to behave opportunistically. As in the previous case,
the informed injurer has a dominant strategy: choose x1 when observing a low cost victim,
and choose x2 when observing a high cost victim. The uninformed injurer can also opt
for three di®erent strategies exerting x1, x2 or an intermediate level between both of them,
x0(y). The intermediate level, xN ; will not play as such any role in this case. Therefore,
the di®erence between the trust and distrust policies is simply a question of labeling the
higher level of care imposed by Courts, as x2 or xN . Contrary to intuition, and given
that the labeling of choice variable is of no substance, the same outcome can be achieved
using the trust policy or the distrust policy. Both policies generate the same equilibria and
payo®s, thus making irrelevant the choice by Courts of rules concerning the credibility of
the injurers' statements.7
6A complete characterization of the optimal solution would require assuming speci¯c functional forms.
7We conjecture that this result can extended to mixed strategies as well.
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5 Implications of the model and the application of the negligence rule
It is a general feature of most, if not all, legal systems, that some easily identi¯able
cathegories of persons are subject to less stringent standards of due care than the average
person. Probably the clearest example of this di®erentiated treatment is given by the
standards of care to which children are subject. Given their lower psychological disposition
and ability to take care, in order to comply with the requirements of the negligence rule,
children don't need to adopt the precautions that the average citizen would take, but just
those of ordinary kids of their age and experience. As the English case Gough v. Thorne8
expressed:
The standard is that of \any ordinary child of 13 12, by which I do not mean a paragon
of prudence, nor do I mean a scatter-brained child, but the ordinary girl of 13 12"
This attitude towards the de¯nition of due care concerning minors is prevalent in Conti-
nental European legal systems (Von Bar (1998), p. 98) and also in the English and Nordic
legal systems (Von Bar (1998), p. 343). In the US legal system, the Restatement of the
Law Third, Torts: General Principles, provides as a general rule for children in x 8:
\When the actor is a child, the actor's conduct is negligent if it does not conform to
that of a reasonably careful person of the same age, intelligence and experience..."
In the Spanish legal system, also, the Supreme Court has consistently (or almost) denied
that naughty, irre°exive, careless actions by children constitute negligent behavior that
might be considered under contributory or comparative negligence rules. It is true, though,
that some cases of reckless disregard of danger, let alone criminal conduct, by minors,
have led to reductions or outright denial of liability due to contributory or comparative
negligence: Ferrer and Ruis¶anchez (1999).
When, as it is usually the case, children (or other types of victim with higher cost of
care) are the victims in the accident, how this a®ects the required levels of care of injurers
involved?
8[1966] 3 All ER 398[1966] 1 WLR.
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5.1 Simultaneous accidents where victim's type is observable
In section 3 we showed that when the type of victim is observable by the injurer, the
¯rst-best is implementable through a rule that imposes upon the injurer di®erentiated
levels of due care depending on the type of victim: a higher level of care when encountering
victims with higher costs of care, and a lower one when facing a victim belonging to the
group having lower costs of care.
This kind of implementation mechanism is precisely what one observes in real-world
legal systems through the use of the negligence rule. The negligence rule discriminates
standards of care on the injurer's side on the basis of the type of victim, when the former
is in the position to know the type of victim when deciding about the level of care.
Thus, for injurers dealing ordinarily with less able types of victims (children, physically
or mentally handicapped persons) the standard of care is substantially higher than the one
applied to injurers engaging in the same kind of activity, but ordinarily not interacting with
those groups of victims. Just to give an example: the Spanish Civil Code and the Spanish
Supreme Court apply very di®erent standards of care to educators dealing with minors (in
primary or secondary institutions) than to University professors, who usually encounter
young adults, but not children, in the course of their educational activities [Ferrer and
Ruis¶anchez (1999), Durany (1999)].
Even when the interaction with the type of victim having higher costs of care is un-
common, or merely casual, most legal systems still provide for enhanced duties of care
correlated to the type of victim encountered, when the injurer observed, or could have
observed, the victim's type. The injurer has to take additional precautions to counteract
the lower level of care expected from that particular type of victim, and failure to do so
would involve negligence and the corresponding liability for the harm caused to the less able
victim [Seidelson (1981), Prosser and Keeton (1984), Von Bar (1998)]. When children, for
instance, are in the vicinity, their sometimes impulsive and thoughtless behavior has to be
anticipated by the potential injurer, and thus, enhanced vigilance and caution is required
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to escape liability, enhanced care that would not be imposed upon injurers in the presence
of an adult as a victim.
This attitude is again consistent with the attainment of ¯rst-best e±ciency in a world
of observable victim's type. The fact that the injurer does not commonly encounter that
particular type of victim, and that she is used to deal with other types of victim does not
make the adoption by the negligence rule of a special and increased standard of care in
these circumstances less attractive on e±ciency grounds.
5.2 Simultaneous accidents where victim's type is not observable
Things are more complicated, also in legal terms, when the victim's type is not readily
observable by the injurer.
It is undisputable that the presence in the population of potential victims of some people
having higher costs of care drives up the optimal level of care with respect to the level of
care that would have been optimal in face of a homogeneous pool of victims. Most legal
systems seem sensitive to changes in the likely composition of the pool of potential victims,
and, at least partially, along the lines that the model presented in section 2 shows to be
consistent with the pursuit of second-best e±ciency. For instance, the increased probability
of the presence or proximity of children seems to push up the standard of care necessary to
avoid being held negligent. Drivers are usually informed by adequate warnings that they
approach a school area and thus, that the pool of pedestrians who might su®er an accident
contains a higher fraction of children than the average neighbourhoods of the city. All legal
systems require extra care from drivers entering an area covered by such a warning. In our
model, it is e±cient to increase the required level of precautions when 1 ¡ ® (the fraction
of high-cost victims in the population of potential victims) increases.
Similarly, when 1¡® a goes down in a certain setting, so does the optimal level of care
on the part of the potential injurer, and so should the due care standard. For instance,
when the pool of potential victims is less likely to contain children or other groups of high-
19
cost victims, the desirable level of care of those carrying on the eventually harmful activity
decreases. This ¯nding seems to give theoretical support to the adult-activity doctrine in
Tort Law9. This doctrine operates as an exception to the general rule that children are
subject to a di®erent and less stringent standard of care than adults. If children engage
in so-called adult activities, they are held to the adult standard of behavior. In those
activities in which typically one does not encounter children (say, driving, or motor-boat
racing), potential injurers expect 1¡® to be zero, and therefore, that all potential victims
are low-cost ones. An increase in the injurer's required level of precaution makes no sense
here.
It is clear, moreover, that activities in which the participation of the high-cost victims
is legally prohibited (like driving for small children or blind persons) due to the overall
dangerousness of its consequences when executed with little care, are obvious candidates
for the application of this doctrine10.
Even without speci¯c signals, it seems that the likely increased presence of potential
victims with higher costs of care su±ces to justify the adoption of more stringent standards
of due care for potential injurers [Prosser and Keeton (1984), p.200]. Some commentators
defend the decision to impose this extra burden of precaution on potential injurers on
fairness grounds: those who face higher costs of care have the right to engage in activities
that allow them to lead independent and enjoyable lives. Children, some argue, have the
right to explore the world and develop as human beings through recurrent interaction with
fellow children, adults, and the rest of the outside world in a substantially unrestrained and
spontaneous manner. At least for certain activities, this right to self-su±ciency, or to self-
development, would arguably justify the extra cost of care that they impose on potential
injurers through increased levels of care under the negligence rule: Keating (2002), Ferrer
and Ruis¶anchez (1999).
9For a discussion of this doctrine and the boundaries of the adult-activity notion, see Prosser and Keeton
(1984), and Dobbs (2000).
10Some commentators argue for a broader use of the adult standard for children, restricting the more
lenient one for those carefree activities necessary for children socialization and development [Forell (1985)].
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It is less clear, though, that the use of more stringent levels of care before populations
of victims with a higher fraction of less able people is totally consistent with our character-
ization of second-best e±ciency. The implementation of second-best in our model would,
in its simplest form, require a rule mandating in every case a standard of care that is in-
termediate between the ¯rst-best optimal towards victims with low costs of care and the
¯rst-best optimal towards high-care victims. It is doubtful that this is really what Courts
do in most cases, given that there is little evidence that the likely presence of children e®ec-
tively elevates the standard of care in the cases in which the actual victim was a low-cost
victim (an adult), and not a high-cost one. Moreover, the direct implementation of the
second-best would imply that high-cost victims would be induced to adopt a higher level
of care than their ¯rst-best optimal, given that the injurer is complying with the inter-
mediate and required level of care as injurer. Nothing of this kind appears mentioned in
the literature, nor the cases, when dealing with contributory and comparative negligence,
contemplate any increase in the levels of care of less able victims in a bilateral accident
with unobservable victim's type11.
Some commentators, moreover, appear to criticize the amalgamation of adults and
children to determine a kind of average level of care (even if, as here is the case, to indirectly
¯x the level of care of a potential injurer facing both types of victim): Landes and Posner
(1987).
In some areas of the Law, one could advance the explanation that the attainment of
the second-best is far from being the motivation behind the rules implemented by the
Courts. Even when observation of the victim's type seems hardly possible, Courts could
11In the simple world of our model, liability rules were implicitly assumed to operate perfectly, and thus,
the negligence rule, unaccompanied by contributory or comparative negligence, was able, on its own, to
do the trick of inducing the e±cient levels of care both for the injurer and the victim. Since the direct
implementation of the second-best in this setting dos not require paying attention to the levels of care of
the victim. The reality that in the actual cases, though, there are no traces of the increased level of care
of the high-cost victims, may be interpreted as indirect evidence of the fact that Courts are not trying to
use a negligence rule that mimicks the direct implementation of the second-best.
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still be using di®erentiated negligence rules based on the victim's type. So, when the person
harmed by the defendant in a given case is a high-cost victim, the level of care required
from the injurer under the negligence rule is the high level that was optimal for that type
of victim (but not for the pool of high- and low-cost victims), whereas when the plainti® is
a low-cost victim, the standard of care that the negligence rule would impose on the injurer
is the low level that was optimal for that type of victim, but no for the pool 12.
This attitude is particularly noticeable in the ¯eld of tort liability of owners or occupiers
of land. The traditional Common Law rule is that landowners owe no duty of reasonable
care to trespassers, and thus, if a trespasser su®ers harm as a result of the trespass, the
owner or possessor will not be liable. The level of care of the landowner towards the
so-to-speak "low-cost trespasser" is low (in fact, at least in principle, zero). The legal
situation di®ers widely when the trespasser is a child. In this case, when the landowner
knew or had reason to know that child trespassers were likely, the landowner owes a duty
of care to the child trespasser. That is, when the potential injurer knew or could have
known about the non-insigni¯cant presence of high-cost victims among the population
of potential trespassers, the standard of care towards them is high (positive, instead of
zero13. Curiously enough, under Spanish Law, the rule, although less clearly stated, is very
similar. The Spanish Supreme Court, in several rulings, has determined that the owners
12Consider the limit case ¾ = 0 of the imperfect observation model developed in section 4. Assume
that Courts use a di®erentiated negligence rule setting two required levels of precautionary e®ort x1and
x2depending on the victims' type (there is no need for Courts to set a third intermediate level in this case).
Under this rule, the injurer would pay damages to the victim if the former is of type µ1 and x < x1or if the
victim is of type µ2 and x <x2. The injurer, however, can only choose a single level of e®ort since he can
not observe the victim's type. Then similarly to the regular case, ¾ 6= 0 , there are only three equilibria:
a) The injurer exerts x1and takes the risk of paying damages in case the actual victim is high cost, b) the
injurer exerts x2and avoids paying any damages in all cases and c) the injurer chooses an intermediate level
between x1and x2; paying damages in case the actual victim is high cost. Speci¯cally, these results hold
when Courts use the ¯rst best levels of care, x1= x¤1 and x2= x
¤
2 .
13A complete account of the American cases can be found in Prosser and Keeton (1984), p. 393, and
Dobbs (2000), p. 592.
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of abandoned dangerous premises (usually, mines or industrial sites) are required to adopt
adequate measures that would avoid harm to inexperienced or irre°exive persons (read:
children), and would be liable in tort if failing to do so [Ferrer and Ruis¶anchez (1999)].
Comparable cases involving adult intruders in the premises would receive a substantially
di®erent solution.
Notice that in these cases, in order to impose upon the injurer the increased duty of
care in front of the less able victims, Courts do not require observability of the victim's
type (in most cases the landowner is unaware of the trespass), simply that the potential
injurer knows, or has reasons to know, that there are high-cost victims. In other words,
Courts diversify the level of due care on the basis of the victim's type despite its apparent
unobservability.
In is clear from our results in the preceding sections that this rule is less desirable on
e±ciency grounds than a rule that simply and directly implements the second-best with
a uniform level of due care for the injurer equal to the second-best optimal precautionary
e®ort. But a case can be made for other factors alien to e±ciency justifying the use of
the di®erentiated standard of care even for apparent non-observability of the victim's type.
If the goal of the legal system is to satisfy some kind of Rawlsian preference in favor of
the welfare of the less well-o® (here, by hypothesis, the group of victims with high costs
of care), a di®erentiated standard for the injurer based on the type of victim actually
encountered might, under the conditions referred to in note above, constitute an attractive
policy alternative.On fairness grounds, the use by Courts of a uniform negligence rule
irrespective of the type of the actual victim encountered by the plainti® in the tort suit
might be considered by many as unfair. One could argue that the uniform rule provides
both injurers and victims with lower costs of care, with the opportunity of free-riding on the
higher costs of care of other groups of potential victims. The presence of the latter groups
allows the more able ones to save costs of care because they can anticipate that the potential
injurer would adopt hundred percent of the times (remember, type is unobservable for the
injurer) more precautions under the uniform rule, precisely due to the fact that there are
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less able victims in the pool. Injurers, on their part, incur costs of care with respect to all
types of victims lower than the ¯rst-best optimal ones with respect to the group of victims
with higher costs of care. Moreover, the uniform negligence rule forces the latter group
of potential victims to increase their levels of precaution, in anticipation of the lower care
that potential injurers will adopt in front of the whole population of victims.
Specially if one considers the typical groups with recognizably higher costs of care
(children, mentally or physically impaired persons), to many people, including many Courts,
these e®ects might strike them as unfair. And some might even advocate that the welfare
of these groups that specially deserve protection by society and by the legal system is well
worth the price of some ine±ciency in the functioning of Tort Law.
It can be shown that in general, the use of a di®erentiated negligence rule based on
the victim's type, although less than optimal in terms of the attaintment of second-best
e±ciency, appears to improve in all cases the lot of the high-cost victims compared with
the uniform rule immediately implementing the second-best optimum.14
A di®erent kind of explanation, though, could be o®ered for the observed pattern of
14As we mention in footnote 12, the use of a di®erentiated negligence rule when the injurer can not
observe the victim type can generate three equilibria. In one equilibrium, the injurers choose the level of
care that is required towards the high-cost victims. As this level of care should be higher than the second
best solution, the level of welfare of the less able victims under the di®erentiated negligence rule is higher
than under the uniform rule directly implementing the second-best. In the other two equilibria, the injurer
neglects totally or partially the presence of the high-cost victims, and opts for the level of precaution that
make him always liable towards high-cost victims alone. As injurers are always found negligent when the
victim is high-cost, and the latter will always be compensated, high cost victims will be induced to incur no
costs of care. If (a big if, though) damages paid by the injurer always cover the harm su®ered by the victim,
the welfare of high-cost victims (though not social welfare) is maximized with the use of the di®erentiated
negligence rule: they have zero costs of care and they are indi®erent, because of the damage payment,
between the occurrence and not occurrence of an accident. Moreover, if the second-best level of care of
potential victims was anyway close to zero (which seems plausible for certain accidents settings given the
cost functions of at least some groups of less able victims), the ine±ciency arising from the di®erentiated
rule is relatively small, and might, at least by some, be considered an a®ordable price to pay in order to
maximize the welfare of children or other disadvantaged groups of potential victims.
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legal rules actually favored by Courts. This pattern is consistent with e±ciency if courts
believe (and this not an unreasonable belief) that zero observability is impossible to discern
from imperfect observability. Coupled with the fact that actual observation by the injurer
in a given case cannot be veri¯ed by Courts, we are fully in the world of section 4 of the
paper. In this setting, we have shown that e±ciency calls for di®erentiated negligence
rules, and that equilibrium behavior by injurers under this e±ciency-oriented di®erentiated
regime would be undistinguishable from the one induced by the fairness-inspired negligence
regime (though victims would take zero case in the latter but not in the former).
We don't have enough evidence about the motivations of Courts to use the di®erentiated
rule in various accident settings, allowing us to conclude which is the most convincing ex-
planation behind the use of di®erentiated rules by Courts in accidents in which observation
of the victim's type seems hardly feasible. May be both of them are not mutually exclusive,
and there is a combination of fairness and e±ciency forces leading to the observed choice
of Courts in di®erent legal systems.
6 Extensions and conclusions
That potential accident victims are heterogeneous in terms of their costs of care is a
fact of life. Some victims face higher costs of taking care than others. In the paper we have
explored the implications of this heterogeneity for the functioning of the negligence rule.
In our approach we have opted for a model of two types of victim, di®ering in their costs
of care. The extension of the model to a larger number of types would be trivial. We have
decided not to extend the model with continuous types of victims, mainly for two reasons.
First, it would essentially replicate the ¯ndings and implications of the discrete two-types
model. Second, from a Law and Economics perspective, a continuous type setting would not
adequately capture the actual perspective of the legal system, in which no consideration
is given to each individual standard of care, but instead, broad (extremely broad, one
could say, or even just one) cathegories are built in order to de¯ne standards of due care.
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In the Law, standards of care are always general and average, and not made-to-measure.
Information costs would be otherwise intractable [Landes and Posner (1987)].
Our model is also built upon the assumption that there is substitutability between
care by victims and injurers. This is the standard assumption in the Law and Economics
literature on bilateral accidents. It could be possible to extend our model to the case of
complementary between the corresponding care e®orts of injurers and victims. The basic
results of our model would then be reversed, because it would be optimal for injurers to
exercise more care with respect to low-cost than with respect to high-cost victims. We
believe, though, that the complementary case is of little relevance for the operation of
liability rules.
To summarize the main results of our paper: we characterize ¯rst-best e±cient levels of
care for the injurer and both types of victims. We also characterize the second-best levels
of care, which cannot be improved when injurers cannot observe the victim's type when
deciding about the level of precaution the will adopt. Turning to the e®ects of the negligence
rule on the adoption of care, we consider a uniform and a di®erentiated (based on the actual
victim's cost of care) negligence rules, both of which seem to be in use in di®erent legal
systems. When the injurer can observe the victim's type, ¯rst-best results can be achieved
using a di®erentiated rule. When this is not the case, a uniform negligence rule with due
care set at the second-best optimal care for the injurer implements the second-best. The
di®erentiated rule cannot do the trick, and is thus less e±cient than the uniform rule in an
unobservable victim's type situation. We also analyze imperfect (as distinct from perfect
or none at all) observation of the victim's type. We characterize the optimal solution in
this setting, and examine the di®erent legal alternatives when Courts cannot verify the
injurers' statements concerning whether they had or not observed the victim before taking
care. Counterintuitively, we show that there is no di®erence at all between the use by
Courts of a rule of complete trust and a rule of complete distrust towards the injurers'
statements. We ¯nally discuss the actual use of several rules and doctrines in various legal
systems, employing the results of the model as our theoretical framework. Speci¯cally,
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we discuss how the departure from e±ciency through the use of the di®erentiated rule in
situations of practically unobservable type might respond to a preference for the welfare
of high-cost victims at the expense of second-best e±ciency, or might be consistent with
e±ciency tied to our results in the imperfect observability setting.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
(x¤i ; y¤i ) 2 argmaxf¡p(xi; yi)D ¡ C(xi)¡ C(yi; µi)g. Then
¡p(x¤1; y¤1)D¡ C(x¤1) ¡C(y¤1; µ1) > ¡p(x¤2; y¤2)D ¡ C(x¤2) ¡ C(y¤2; µ1)
¡p(x¤2; y¤2)D¡ C(x¤2) ¡C(y¤2; µ2) > ¡p(x¤1; y¤1)D ¡ C(x¤1) ¡ C(y¤1; µ2)
Adding up the two equations and simplifying, we obtain:
¡C(y¤1; µ1) ¡C(y¤2; µ2) > ¡C(y¤2; µ1)¡ C(y¤1; µ2)
Then
C(y¤1; µ2) ¡C(y¤1; µ1) > C(y¤2; µ2) ¡ C(y¤2; µ1)
@2C(y;µ)
@µ@y > 0 this implies y
¤
1 > y¤2:
Proof of Lemma 2
(x¤i ; y¤i ) 2 argmaxf¡p(xi; yi)D ¡ C(xi)¡ C(yi; µi)g
The ¯rst order condition of x¤i is
¡@p(x
¤
i ; y¤i )
@x
D ¡ C0(x¤i ) = 0
Applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain
@x¤i
@y¤i
= ¡ ¡
@2p(x;y)
@x@y
¡@2p(x¤i ;y¤i )@x2 D ¡ C 00(x¤i )
< 0
From the previous Lemma we know that y¤1 > y¤2, then x¤1 < x¤2:
Proof of Lemma 3
For the same argument used in the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 4
The ¯rst order condition of x¤¤ is
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¡®@p(x
¤¤; y¤¤1 )
@x
D ¡ (1 ¡®)@p(x
¤¤; y¤¤2 )
@x
D ¡ C0(x¤¤) = 0
Applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain
@x¤¤
@® = ¡
¡@p(x¤¤;y¤¤1 )@x D+ @p(x
¤¤;y¤¤2 )
@x D
¡® @2p(x¤¤;y¤¤1 )@x2 D ¡ (1¡ ®) @
2p(x¤¤;y¤¤2 )
@x2 D ¡ C00(x¤¤)
< 0
This is because, @
2p(x;y)
@x@y > 0 and y
¤¤
1 > y¤¤2 implies that
@p(x¤¤;y¤¤2 )
@x <
@p(x¤¤;y¤¤1 )
@x .
Finally if ® = 1 the victim is type µ1 with probability 1, and the second best solution
coincides with the ¯rst best solution since there is perfect information over victim type,
x¤¤ = x¤1 . For the same token, if ® = 0 then x¤¤ = x¤2:
Proof of Lemma 5
The ¯rst order condition of y¤i coincides with the ¯rst order condition of y¤¤i , and it is
¡@p(x; yi)
@y
D ¡ C 0(yi; µi) = 0
Applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain
@y
@x
= ¡ ¡
@2p(x;y)
@x@y
¡@2p(x;yi )@y2 D ¡C 00(yi; µi)
> 0
Then, using that x¤¤ 2 [x¤1; x¤2], we can conclude that y¤¤1 < y¤1 and y¤¤2 > y¤2.
Proof of Lemma 6
We denote by xDLi the precaution e®ort of the injurer when he is facing a victim of type
i: There are two cases
1. First, we consider that xDLi ¸ x¤i : In this case, the injurer is not liable and conse-
quently he has not to compensate the victim for any harm. Therefore, the injurer
will never choose a precaution e®ort larger than x¤i when he observes that the type
of the victim is i: If the injurer exerts a precaution e®ort of x¤i , the optimal response
of the victim will be yDLi 2 argmaxf¡p(x¤i ; yi)D ¡ C(yi; µi)g . The solution of this
problem coincides with the ¯rst best solution, yDL1 = y¤1 and yDL2 = y¤2:
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2. Assume now that, the injurer chooses xDLi < x¤i . In this case, the victim optimal
response is yDLi = 0 since in case of accident he will be compensated by the injurer.
Then in case of xDLi < x¤i ; the optimal response of the injurer us xDLi = x0, where
x0 2 arg maxf¡p(x; 0)D ¡ C(x)g:
Now we show that the injurer prefer the case 1 to the case 2. This is because, the ¯rst
best solution maximizes the total surplus, and with the ¯rst best the victim is worse o®
(he has an expected cost of ¡p(x¤i ; y¤i )D ¡ C(y¤i ; µi)) than in the case in which xDLi < x¤i
(the victim has not to bear any cost). Therefore, if the total surplus is larger in the ¯rst
best solution and the surplus of the victim is lower necessarily the injurer has larger surplus
with the ¯rst best solution.
Proof of Lemma 7
We denote by xL the precaution e®ort of the injurer: There two cases
1. First, we consider that xL ¸ x¤¤: In this case, the injurer is not liable and consequently
he has not to compensate the victim for any harm. Therefore, the injurer will never
choose an precaution e®ort larger than x¤¤: If the injurer exerts an precaution e®ort of
x¤¤, the optimal response of the victim will be yLi 2 argmaxf¡p(x¤¤; yi)D¡C(yi; µi)g
. The solution of this problem coincides with the second best solution, yL1 = y¤¤1 and
yL2 = y¤¤2 :
2. Assume now that, the injurer chooses xL < x¤¤. In this case, the victim optimal
response is yLi = 0 since in case of accident he will be compensated by the injurer.
Then in case of xL < x¤¤; the optimal response of the injurer us xL = x0, where
x0 2 arg maxf¡p(x; 0)D ¡ C(x)g:
Now we show that the injurer prefer the case 1 to the case 2. This is because, the
second best solution maximizes the total surplus, and with the second best the victim
is worse o® (he has an expected cost of ¡p(x¤¤; y¤¤i )D¡C(y¤¤i ; µi)) than in the case in
which xL < x¤¤ (the victim has not to bear any cost). Therefore, if the total surplus
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is larger in the second best solution and the surplus of the victim is lower necessarily
the injurer has larger surplus with the second best solution.
Proof of Lemma 8
For the same argument used in the proof of Lemma 1, y¤N1 > y¤N2 : Provided that
y¤N1 > y¤N2 and using the same argument used in the proof of Lemma 2 we obtain that
x¤N1 < x¤NN < x¤N2 . The ¯rst order condition of y¤N1 is
¡¾ @p(x
¤N
1 ; y¤N1 )
@y
D ¡ (1¡ ¾)@p(x
¤N
N ; y¤N1 )
@y
D ¡ C0(y¤N1 ; µ1) = 0
Applying the implicit function theorem
@y¤N1
@¾
= ¡ ¡
@p(x¤N1 ;y¤N1 )
@y D +
@p(x¤NN ;y¤N1 )
@y D
¡¾ @2p(x¤¤;y¤¤1 )@y2 D ¡ (1¡ ¾) @
2p(x¤¤;y¤¤2 )
@y2 D ¡ C 00(y¤N1 ; µ1)
> 0
This is because, @
2p(x;y)
@x@y > 0 and x
¤N
1 < x¤NN implies that
@p(x¤N1 ;y¤N1 )
@y <
@p(x¤NN ;y
¤N
1 )
@y .
If ¾ = 1 the injurer observes the victim with probability 1, and y¤N1 must coincide with
the ¯rst best solution y¤1. Then, if ¾ is lower than 1, y¤N1 < y¤1: For the same token,
@y¤N2
@¾ < 0
and if ¾ is lower than 1, y¤N2 > y¤2: Finally, for the same argument used in the proof of
Lemma 2, y¤N1 < y¤1 leads to x¤N1 > x¤1, and y¤N2 > y¤2 leads to x¤N2 < x¤2.
Proof of Lemma 9
For similar arguments to the ones used in the proof of Lemma 8.
Proof of Lemma 10
For similar arguments to the ones used in the proof of Lemma 8.
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